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Abstract
A policy is said to be robust if it maximizes the re-
ward while considering a bad, or even adversarial,
model. In this work we formalize two new criteria
of robustness to action uncertainty. Specifically,
we consider two scenarios in which the agent at-
tempts to perform an action a, and (i) with prob-
ability α, an alternative adversarial action a¯ is
taken, or (ii) an adversary adds a perturbation to
the selected action in the case of continuous ac-
tion space. We show that our criteria are related to
common forms of uncertainty in robotics domains,
such as the occurrence of abrupt forces, and sug-
gest algorithms in the tabular case. Building on
the suggested algorithms, we generalize our ap-
proach to deep reinforcement learning (DRL) and
provide extensive experiments in the various Mu-
JoCo domains. Our experiments show that not
only does our approach produce robust policies,
but it also improves the performance in the ab-
sence of perturbations. This generalization indi-
cates that action-robustness can be thought of as
implicit regularization in RL problems.
1. Introduction
Recent advances in Reinforcement Learning (RL) have
demonstrated its potential in real-world deployment. How-
ever, since in RL it is normally assumed that the train and
test domains are identical, it is not clear how a learned policy
would generalize under small perturbations. For example,
consider the task of robotic manipulation in which the task
is to navigate towards a goal. As the policy is trained on a
specific parameter set (mass, friction, etc...), it is not clear
what would happen when these parameters change, e.g., if
the robot is slightly lighter/heavier.
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The advantage of robust policies is highlighted when con-
sidering imperfect models, a common scenario in real world
tasks such as autonomous vehicles. Even if the model is
trained in the real world, certain variables such as traction,
tire pressure, humidity, vehicle mass and road conditions
may vary over time. These changes affect the dynamics of
our model, a property which should be considered during the
optimization process. Robust MDPs (Nilim & El Ghaoui,
2005; Iyengar, 2005; Wiesemann et al., 2013) tackle this
issue by solving a max-min optimization problem over a set
of possible model parameters, an uncertainty set, e.g., the
range of values which the vehicle’s mass may take - the goal
is thus to maximize the reward, with respect to (w.r.t.) the
worst possible outcome.
Previously, Robust MDPs have been analyzed extensively
in the theoretical community, in the tabular case (Nilim &
El Ghaoui, 2005; Iyengar, 2005; Xu & Mannor, 2007; Man-
nor et al., 2012; Wiesemann et al., 2013) and under linear
function approximation (Tamar et al., 2013). However, as
these works analyze uncertainty in the transition probabili-
ties: (i) it is not clear how to obtain these uncertainty sets,
and (ii) it is not clear if and how these approaches may
be extended to non-linear function approximation schemes,
e.g., neural networks. Recently, this problem has been tack-
led, empirically, by the Deep RL community (Pinto et al.,
2017; Peng et al., 2018). While these approaches seem to
work well in practice, they require access and control of a
simulator and are not backed by theoretical guarantees - a
well known problem in adversarial training (Barnett, 2018).
Our approach tackles these problems by introducing a nat-
ural way to define robustness - robustness w.r.t. action
perturbations - a scenario in which the agent attempts to
perform an action and due to disturbances, such as noise or
model uncertainty, acts differently than expected. In this
work, we consider two distinct robustness criteria: given an
action provided by the policy (i) the Probabilistic Action
Robust MDP (PR-MDP, Section 3) criterion considers the
case in which, with probability α, a different possibly adver-
sarial action is taken; and (ii) the Noisy Action Robust MDP
(NR-MDP, Section 4) criterion, in which a perturbation is
added to the action itself. These two criteria are strongly
correlated to real world uncertainty; the former correlates to
abrupt interruptions such as a sudden push and the latter cor-
relates to a constant interrupting force. For instance, if the
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robot is heavier, this may be seen as an adversary applying
force in the opposite direction (Bas¸ar & Bernhard, 2008).
In Section 6, we extend our approach to Deep RL, perform
extensive evaluation across several MuJoCo (Todorov et al.,
2012) environments and show the ability of our approach to
produce robust policies. We empirically analyze the differ-
ences between the PR-MDP and NR-MDP approaches, and
demonstrate their ability to produce robust policies under
abrupt perturbations and mass uncertainty. Surprisingly, we
observe that even in the absence of perturbations, solving for
the action robust criteria results in improved performance1.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Markov Decision Process
We consider the framework of infinite-horizon discounted
Markov Decision Process (MDP) with continuous action
space. An MDP is defined as the 5-tuple (S,A, P,R, γ)
(Puterman, 1994), where S is a finite state space, A is
a compact and convex action metric space. We assume
P ≡ P (s′ | s,a) is a transition kernel and is weakly con-
tinuous in a, R ≡ r(s,a) is a reward function continuous
in a, and γ ∈ (0, 1). Let pi : S → P(A) be a stationary
policy, where P(A) is the set of probability measures on
the Borel sets of A. We denote Π as the set of stationary
deterministic policies on A, i.e., if pi ∈ Π then pi : S → A,
and P(Π) as the set of stationary stochastic policies. Let
vpi ∈ R|S| be the value of a policy pi, defined in state s as
vpi(s) ≡ Epi[∑∞t=0 γtr(st,at) | s0 = s], where at ∼ pi(st)
is a random-variable, Epi denotes expectation w.r.t. the distri-
bution induced by pi and conditioned on the event {s0 = s}.
The goal is to find a policy pi∗, yielding
the optimal value v∗, i.e., for all s ∈ S,
pi∗(s) ∈ arg maxpi′∈P(Π) Epi
′
[
∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st,at) | s0 = s],
and the optimal value is v∗(s) = vpi
∗
(s). It is known, and
quite surprising, that there always exists an optimal policy
which is stationary and deterministic, meaning pi∗ ∈ Π,
e.g., (Puterman, 1994)[Theorem 6.2.10].
We note that in all following results we assume continuity of
the dynamics and reward in actions. For the exact definitions
see Appendix A.1 , Assumption 1.
2.2. Zero-Sum Games
As opposed to the standard MDP framework, in a two player
zero-sum game, the reward function and transition kernels
are functions of both players a ∈ A and a¯ ∈ A¯, where
A, A¯ are compact sets. Assuming the policy of player 1
is pi and p¯i of player 2, the value of the game is defined
∀s ∈ S, vpi,p¯i(s) ≡ Epi,p¯i[∑∞t=0 γtr(st, at, a¯t) | s0 = s].
Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970) generalized result of Shapley
1Our code can be found in the following repository:
https://github.com/tesslerc/ActionRobustRL
(1953) and established that, under proper conditions, the
zero sum game has value for any s ∈ S, i.e.,
v∗(s) = max
pi∈P(Π)
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi,p¯i[
∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at, a¯t) | s0 = s],
= min
p¯i∈P(Π)
max
pi∈Π
Epi,p¯i[
∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at, a¯t) | s0 = s].
Note that, in the general case, the optimal maximizing policy
is selected from the set of stochastic policies. Policies which
attain this value, pi∗ and p¯i∗ for the maximizer and minimizer
players, respectively, are said to be in Nash-Equilibrium. In
such a scenario, neither player may improve it’s outcome
further, e.g., ∀pi, p¯i ∈ P(Π), vpi,p¯i∗ ≤ v∗ ≤ vpi∗,p¯i.
3. Probabilistic Action Robust MDP
In this section we introduce the Probabilistic Action Robust
MDP (PR-MDP), which can be viewed as a zero-sum game
between an agent and an adversary. We refer to the optimal
policy of the max-agent in PR-MDP as the optimal prob-
abilistic robust policy. Furthermore, we establish that the
game has a well defined value and analyze some properties
of this criterion. Lastly, we formulate Policy Iteration (PI)
schemes that solve the PR-MDP, and show that they inherit
properties corresponding to single agent PI schemes.
Definition 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Probabilistic Action Robust
MDP is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1).
Let pi, p¯i be policies of an agent an adversary. We define their
probabilistic joint policy pimixP,α(pi, p¯i) as ∀s ∈ S, pimixP,α(a |
s) ≡ (1− α)pi(a | s) + αp¯i(a | s).
Let pi be an agent policy. As opposed to stan-
dard MDPs, the value of the policy is defined by
vpiP,α = minp¯i∈Π E
pimixP,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t γ
tr(st,at)], where
at ∼ pimixP,α(pi(st), p¯i(st)). The optimal probabilistic robust
policy is the optimal policy of the PR-MDP
pi∗P,α ∈ arg max
pi∈P(Π)
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
P,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)]. (1)
The optimal probabilistic robust value is v∗P,α = v
pi∗P,α
P,α .
Simply put, an optimal probabilistic robust policy is optimal
w.r.t. a scenario in which, with probability α, an adver-
sary takes control and performs the worst possible action.
This approach formalizes a possible inability to control the
system and to perform the wanted actions.
In-order to obtain the optimal probabilistic robust policy,
one needs to solve the zero-sum game as defined in (1)
(see Appendix B.1 for a formal mapping). It is well known
(Straffin, 1993) that any zero-sum game has a well defined
value on the set of stochastic policies, but not always on
the set of deterministic policies. Interestingly, and similarly
to regular MDPs, the optimal policy of the PR-MDP is a
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deterministic one as the following proposition asserts (see
proof in Appendix B.2).
Proposition 1. For PR-MDP, there exists an optimal policy
which is stationary and deterministic, and strong duality
holds in Π,
v∗P,α = max
pi∈Π
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
P,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)]
= min
p¯i∈Π
max
pi∈Π
Epi
mix
P,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)].
3.1. Probabilistic Action Robust and Robust MDPs
Although the approach of PR-MDP might seem orthogonal
to the that of Robust MDPs, the former is a specific case of
the latter. By using the PR-MDP criterion, a class of models
is implicitly defined, and the probabilistic robust policy is
optimal w.r.t. the worst possible model in this class.
To see the equivalence, define the following class of models,
Pα = {(1− α)P + αPpi : P(Π)}
Rα = {(1− α)r + αrpi : pi ∈ P(Π)}.
A probabilistic robust policy, which solves (1), is also the
solution to the following RMDP (see Appendix B.3),
pi∗P,α ∈ arg max
pi′∈Π
min
P∈Pα,r∈Rα
Epi
′
P [
∑
t
γtr(st,at)],
where EpiP is the expectation of policy pi when the dynamics
are given by P . This relation explicitly shows that pi∗P,α
is also optimal w.r.t. the worst model in the class Pα,Rα,
which is convex and rectangular uncertainty set (Epstein &
Schneider, 2003), and formalizes the fact that PR-MDP is a
specific instance of RMDP.
3.2. Policy Iteration Schemes for PR-MDP
In this section, we analyze Policy Iteration (PI) schemes
that solve (1). Although a Value-Iteration procedure can
be easily derived, we focus on the possible PI schemes.
PI schemes are central to the currently used actor-critic
approaches in continuous control, which we focus on in
our experiments. We present two algorithms, Probabilistic
Robust PI (Algorithm 1) and Soft Probabilistic Robust PI
(Algorithm 2), and discuss the relation between the two.
The Probabilistic Robust PI (PR-PI, Algorithm 1) is a two
player PI scheme adjusted to solving a PR-MDP (e.g., Rao
et al. (1973); Hansen et al. (2013)). PR-PI repeats two
stages, (i) given a fixed adversary strategy, it calculates the
optimal counter strategy, and (ii) it solves the 1-step greedy
policy w.r.t. the value of the agent and adversary mixture
policy. As suggested in Shani et al. (2018), Section 3.1,
stage (i) may be performed by any MDP solver.
The Soft Probabilistic Robust PI (Soft PR-PI, Algorithm 2)
is updated using gradient information, unlike the PR-PI. In-
stead of updating the adversary policy using a 1-step greedy
update, the adversary policy is updated using a Frank-Wolfe
update (Frank & Wolfe, 1956). The Franke-Wolfe update,
similar to the gradient-projection method, finds a policy
which is within the set of feasible policies; as, for instance,
the gradient may produce policies out of the simplex. It
works by finding the valid policy with the highest corre-
lation, i.e., inner product, with the direction of gradient
descent and performs a step towards it. As a convex mixture
of two policies is a valid policy, the new policy is ensured
to be a valid one.
Although the two algorithms might seem disparate, Soft
PR-PI merely generalizes the ‘hard’ updates of PR-PI to
‘soft’ ones. This statement is formalized in the following
proposition, which is a direct consequence of Theorem 1
in Scherrer & Geist (2014), see proof in Appendix B.4.
Proposition 2. Let pi, p¯i be general policies. Then,
arg min
p¯i′∈Π
rp¯i
′
+ γP p¯i
′
vpi
mix
P,α(pi,p¯i)
= arg min
p¯i′∈Π
〈
p¯i′,∇p¯ivpimixP,α(pi,p˜i) |p˜i=p¯i
〉
.
Notice that the first single agent, 1-step improvement, has a
solution in the set of deterministic policies (since the action
space is a compact set and the argument is continuous in the
action). Thus, p¯i in Algorithm 2 is exactly the 1-step greedy
policy used in Algorithm 1. This suggests that for η = 1
Algorithm 2 is completely equivalent to Algorithm 1.
Generally, in two-player PI, the improvement stage amounts
to solving a max-min, 1-step, decision problem. In PR-PI it
is clearly not the case; in the improvement stage, a single
agent, 1-step-greedy policy, is solved. Solving the latter
is easier than solving the former, and it is a result of the
specific structure of PR-MDP which does not generally hold,
as will be demonstrated in Section 4.
The following result shows that in both algorithms the
value converges to the unique optimal value of the Nash-
Equilibrium (see proof in Appendix B.5).
Theorem 3. Denote by vk
def
= vpi
mix
P,α(pik,p¯ik). Then, for any
η ∈ (0, 1], in Algorithm 2, vk contracts toward v∗P,α with
coefficient (1− η + γη), i.e.,
||vk − v∗P,α||∞ ≤ (1− η + γη)||vk−1 − v∗P,α||∞ .
Due to the equivalence of Algorithms 1 and 2 (when η = 1),
we get as a corollary that PR-PI converges toward the unique
Nash-Equilibrium.
Remark 1. The solution method of the arg max and
arg min in both Algorithms 1 and 2 can be swapped and
the convergence guarantees remain, e.g., p¯i is the optimal
solution to the MDP given pi, whereas pi is updated using
the 1-step greedy approach w.r.t. p¯i.
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Algorithm 1 Probabilistic Robust PI
Initialize: α, p¯i0, k = 0
while not changing do
pik ∈ arg maxpi′ vpi
mix
P,α(pi
′,p¯ik)
p¯ik+1 ∈ arg minp¯i rp¯i + γP p¯ivpi
mix
P,α(pik,p¯ik)
k ← k + 1
end while
Return pik−1
Algorithm 2 Soft Probabilistic Robust PI
Initialize: α, η, p¯i0, k = 0
while criterion is not satisfied do
pik ∈ arg maxpi′ vpi
mix
P,α(pi
′,p¯ik)
p¯i ∈ arg minp¯i′
〈
p¯i′,∇p¯ivpimixP,α(pik,p¯i) |p¯i=p¯ik
〉
p¯ik+1 = (1− η)p¯ik + ηp¯i
k ← k + 1
end while
Return pik−1
Remark 2. Although Soft PR-PI converges slower than
the non-soft version, it is reasonable to assume the former
will be less sensitive to errors than the latter. Soft PR-PI
can be seen as a generalization of Conservative PI (CPI)
to solving PR-MDPs. CPI is known to be less sensitive
to errors than other PI schemes (Scherrer & Geist, 2014).
Nonetheless, the error analysis for Soft PR-PI is substan-
tially different than the one CPI (Kakade & Langford, 2002;
Scherrer, 2014). In Soft PR-PI, small changes in the adver-
sarial policy may result in dramatic changes in the agent’s
policy. Thus, the γ-weighted state occupancy under a mea-
sure ν, d
pimixP,α(pik,p¯ik)
ν =
∑
t γ
tνPpi
mix
P,α(pik,p¯ik), may change
dramatically between iterations, whereas in CPI the change
is smooth. We leave the error analysis for future work.
4. Noisy Action Robust MDP
In this section we consider an alternative definition for ac-
tion robustness. Instead of a stochastic perturbation in the
policy space, as in Section 3, we consider a perturbation in
the action space. To formally study such a perturbation we
define the Noisy Action Robust MDP (NR-MDP), which,
similarly to the PR-MDP, can be viewed as a zero-sum game
(see Appendix C.1 for a formal mapping). We continue by
establishing some properties of this MDP while highlighting
important differences relative to the approach of PR-MDP.
Definition 2. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Noisy Action Robust MDP
is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1). Let
pi, p¯i be policies of an agent and an adversary. We define
their noisy joint policy pimixN,α(pi, p¯i) as
∀s ∈ S,a ∈ A, pimixN,α(a | s) ≡ Eb∼pi(·|s)
b¯∼p¯i(·|s)
[1a=(1−α)b+αb¯],
the relation is obtained by the fact that a ∼ pi, a¯ ∼ p¯i.
Let pi be an agent policy. For NR-MDP, its value
is defined by vpiN,α = minp¯i∈Π E
pimixN,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t γ
tr(st,at)],
where at ∼ pimixN,α(pi(st), p¯i(st)). The optimal α-noisy ro-
bust policy is the optimal policy of the NR-MDP
pi∗N,α ∈ arg max
pi∈P(Π)
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)]. (2)
The optimal noisy robust value is v∗N,α = v
pi∗N,α
N,α .
In simple terms; an optimal noisy robust policy is optimal
w.r.t. a scenario, in which an adversary may change the
agent’s actions by adding bounded perturbations; the action
performed on the system is (1 − α)a+αa¯, where a¯ is an
action drawn from possibly adverserial distribution p¯i. The
adversary’s ability to add perturbations is controlled through
the parameter α. Each value of α defines a new continuous-
action NR-MDP, where for α = 0 the adversary is unable
to affect the system and the decision problem collapses to
the standard, non-robust, MDP formulation.
The assumption on the structure of A is required, in order
to ensure that the α-mixture actions are valid actions, an as-
sumption which holds naturally in the domain of continuous
control. This approach formalizes a specific meaning for
perturbation in the action space.
Although the approach of PR-MDP (Section 3) and NR-
MDP are closely related, they are not equivalent and im-
portant differences exist between the two. Unlike PR-MDP,
for which a deterministic stationary optimal policy exists,
generally, for NR-MDP it is not the case. The optimal noisy
robust policy, in the general case, is a stochastic policy (see
proof in Appendix C.2).
Proposition 4. There exists an NR-MDP such that,
max
pi∈Π
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)]
< max
pi∈P(Π)
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at))].
Furthermore, strong duality does not necessarily hold on
the class of deterministic policies, Π.
The above proposition tells us that while it is often easier
to focus on deterministic strategies (policies), when con-
sidering the NR-MDP scenario the optimal strategy may
be stochastic. A similar notion has been shown to hold in
non-cooperative matrix games (Nash, 1951), in which the
optimal strategy is stochastic.
Action Robust Reinforcement Learning and Applications in Continuous Control
4.1. Policy Iteration for NR-MDPs
In section 3.2, we formulated PI schemes to solve PR-MDPs.
Unlike two-player zero-sum PI (Rao et al., 1973; Hansen
et al., 2013), in PR-PI (Algorithm 1) a single agent decision
problem is solved, when the adversary policy p¯ik+1 is up-
dated. This structure is indeed unique to the PR-MDP, and
does not hold when generalizing two-player zero-sum PI to
solve NR-MDP.
Specifically, consider the two-player zero-sum PI that re-
peats the following two stages:
1.pik ∈ arg max
pi∈Π
vpi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯ik),
2.pik ∈ arg min
p¯i∈P(Π)
max
pi∈Π
rpi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i) + Ppi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)vpi
mix
N,α(pik,p¯ik).
vpi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯ik) is the value of the joint policy pimixN,α(pi, p¯ik),
rpi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)(s) = Ea∼pi,a¯∼p¯i[r(s, (1− α)a+αa¯)], and
Ppi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)(s, s′) = Ea∼pi,a¯∼p¯i[P (s | s, (1 − α)a+αa¯)]
are the induced reward and dynamics from by
pimixN,α(pi, p¯i). Following similar lines of proof as in
Hansen et al. (2013) or as in Theorem 3, a similar
γ-contraction result may be achieved for the NR-MDP, e.g.,
||vk − v∗N,α||∞ ≤ γ||vk−1 − v∗N,α||∞.
In such an algorithm, stage (1) is performed by solving an
MDP, as in PR-PI. However, stage (2) requires solving a
1-step min-max problem. For general reward and transition
probabilities it cannot be solved by solving a single-agent
decision problem, as in the second stage of PR-PI (Algo-
rithm 1). Furthermore, the solution of stage (2) cannot be
achieved by a single-call to a gradient oracle as in Proposi-
tion 2 (we elaborate the discussion in Appendix C.3).
Regardless of these differences, in Section 6, we will use
the approach of Soft PR-PI and offer DRL algorithms to
solve both the PR and NR MDPs. While the approach we
consider in Section 6 should be understood as a heuristic
for solving NR-MDP, it is based on Algorithm 2, which
guarantees convergence for PR-MDP in the error-free case.
5. Related Work
Robust RL: Traditional works in RL, such as Nilim &
El Ghaoui (2005) and Iyengar (2005) have provided efficient
algorithms for solving Robust MDPs, with uncertainty in the
transition probabilities. Mannor et al. (2012) extended their
approach to non-rectangular uncertainty sets, e.g., coupled
uncertainty sets. However, these approaches are limited to
solutions in the tabular case. Additionally, a connection
between robustness and generalization has been suggested
(Xu et al., 2009; Xu & Mannor, 2012), while it is not clear
how this holds in RL, we believe that there lies a similar yet
complex connection between the two concepts.
Control: Obtaining robust policies in continuous control
problems has been extensively investigated in the past. Most
closely related to our work, are max-min Robust Control
approaches (e.g., Bemporad et al. (2003); Kerrigan & Ma-
ciejowski (2004); de la Pena et al. (2006). In this line of
work, a control policy which is robust w.r.t. deterministic
perturbations is calculated. There, the max-min problem
is solved via Linear program, Quadratic program or by an
explicit tree-search. Here, we focus on PI, and gradient
based, schemes to solve a more specific problem; action
robust policies. Furthermore, and to the best of our knowl-
edge, in this line of works, discussion on the existence of
strong-duality does not exists (i.e., as Proposition 1 and 4
assert for PR- and NR-MDPs).
Robust Supervised Learning: Similar to the Ro-
bust MDPs framework, robustness to adversarial exam-
ples/attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013) is a measure of robustness
in supervised learning. A method of learning robust clas-
sifiers is through Generative Adversarial Networks (Good-
fellow et al., 2014). Similar to our approach, when using
GANs for robustness, an adversary learns to create small
perturbations in the input data in an attempt to cause a mis-
classification (Xiao et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018;
Kurakin et al., 2018). While these methods work well in
practice, they generally lack convergence proofs and should
thus be treated as heuristics.
6. Experiments
6.1. Method
Our approach adapts the Soft PR-PI algorithm to the high
dimensional scenario. While in the tabular case we may use
an MDP solver, which produces the optimal policy; when
considering parametrized policies, e.g., neural networks, a
dual-gradient approach is taken. In this approach, both the
Actor and the Adversary are trained using gradient descent;
as it is hard to measure convergence - we train the actor for
N gradient steps followed by a single adversary step.
We focus on a robust variant of DDPG which we call Action-
Robust DDPG (AR-DDPG, see Appendix D, Algorithm 5).
DDPG (Lillicrap et al., 2015) trains an actor to predict an
action for each state µθ : S → A (i.e., a deterministic
policy). In AR-DDPG we train two networks, deterministic
policies, the actor and adversary, denoted by µθ and µ¯θ¯.
Similarly to DDPG, a critic is trained to estimate the q-
function of the joint-policy. For PR-MDP (Definition 1), the
joint policy is
pimixP,α(u |s; θ, θ¯)=(1− α)δ(u− µθ(s)) + αδ(u− µ¯θ¯(s)),
(3)
whereas for NR-MDP (Definition 2), the joint policy is,
pimixN,α(u |s; θ, θ¯)=δ(u− ((1− α)µθ(s) + αµ¯θ¯(s))), (4)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function.
The following result generalizes DPG (Silver et al., 2014)
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for both PR and NR-MDPs. i.e., it establishes how to update
θ and θ¯ using a deterministic gradient based method.
Proposition 5. Let µθ, µ¯θ¯ be the agent’s and adversary’s
deterministic policies, respectively. Let pi(µθ, µ¯θ¯) be the
joint policy given the agent and adversary policies. i.e., for
PR-MDP pi = pimixP,α (3), and for NR-MDP pi = pi
mix
N,α (4).
Let J(pi(µθ, µ¯θ¯)) = Es∼ρpi [vpi(s)] be the performance ob-
jective. The gradient of the actor and adversary parameters,
for both PR- and NR-MDP is:
∇θJ(pi(µθ, µ¯θ¯)) = (1−α)Es∼ρpi [∇θµθ(s)∇aQpi(s,a)] ,
∇θ¯J(pi(µθ, µ¯θ¯)) = αEs∼ρpi [∇θ¯µ¯θ¯(s)∇a¯Qpi(s, a¯)] .
where for the PR-MDP we have a = µθ(s) and a¯ = µ¯θ¯(s),
and for the NR-MDP a = a¯ = (1− α)µθ(s) + αµ¯θ¯(s).
A proof, example algorithm and block diagram are provided
in Appendix D.
In order to validate our approach, we consider several Mu-
JoCo domains (Todorov et al., 2012). MuJoCo contains
several continuous control problems, such as robotic manip-
ulation, in which we may test the ability of our approach to
produce robust policies. Intuitively, our Probabilistic oper-
ator is correlative to the occurrence of large abrupt forces,
e.g., someone suddenly pushes the robot, whereas the Noisy
operator is correlative to mass uncertainty, e.g., the robot is
heavier or lighter.
Our evaluation is split into two parts, we begin by compar-
ing the various hyper-parameters and how they affect the
performance of both the NR and PR-MDP approaches. This
evaluation is performed extensively on a single domain, the
Hopper-v2 task, and the figures are provided in the appendix.
We then compare the best performing variants across unseen
domains. By doing so we test the transferability of these
hyper-parameters across domains.
6.2. Theory versus Practice
Our theoretical approach, Soft PR-PI (Algorithm 2), is
proven for the PR-MDP. The algorithm is based on a dy-
namic programming approach, (i) given a fixed adversary
policy, solves the optimal agent’s policy, (ii) updates the
adversary policy using gradients.
1. While in theory, for the PR criterion, there exists a
deterministic optimal policy - this does not necessarily
hold for the NR case (Proposition 4). Thus searching
over the space of deterministic policies is sub-optimal.
2. Theoretical approaches in general require exact com-
putation, however, in practice, we use function ap-
proximation schemes, e.g., deep neural networks. As
such, convergence can not be ensured and the approach
should be seen as a heuristic.
Regardless of these differences, we based the empirical
approach for both PR and NR-MDPs on Algorithm 2.
NR-MDP PR-MDP
Figure 1. Hopper-v2: Performance of both the NR and PR-MDP
criteria as a function of the uncertainty α.
6.3. Hyperparameter Ablation
Table 1. Hyper-parameters considered.
α values 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2
Actor update steps N 2, 5, 10 and 20
The hyper-parameters we consider are shown in Table 1. In
addition, we consider 3 exploration schemes: noiseless (on-
policy exploration), Ornstein Ulenbeck (OU, Uhlenbeck
& Ornstein (1930)) and Parameter space noise (Plappert
et al., 2017). Each configuration, is trained on 5 random
seeds and the final policy, once the training is concluded, is
evaluated across 100 episodes. The evaluation is performed
without adversarial perturbations, on a range of mass values
not encountered during training, i.e., we test the ability of
the action robust approach to produce policies which are
robust to model uncertainty. The baseline we compare to, is
DDPG with parameter space noise for exploration, which
performed best in our experiments.
The extensive comparison is presented in the appendix, how-
ever the main conclusion is shown in Figure 1. While there
is a clear correlation between the value of α and the per-
formance of the PR-MDP criteria, e.g., an optimal value
is attained at α ∈ [0.1, 0.15] and deviating from this range
results in performance deterioration - this is not the case
for the NR-MDP. Although the NR-MDP often attains com-
petitive results, it is not clear how the various parameters
affect it. We conclude that the for our simple gradient based
approach, the PR approach exhibits a more stable behavior
than the NR approach.
Specifically, for the PR-MDP we decided to use Parameter
space noise with α = 0.1 and a ratio of 10:1. Even though
there are certain configurations under which the OU noise
variant outperformed the Parameter space noise, we decided
on the latter as it exhibited higher stability and is thus more
likely to transfer easily to new domains. Similarly, a large α
provides greater control to the adversary, as such we decided
on a more conservative value of 0.1.
For the NR-MDP this selection process is somewhat harder;
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Baseline NR-MDP PR-MDP
Hopper
Walker2d
Humanoid
InvertedPendulum
Figure 2. Robustness to model uncertainty. Noise probability denotes the probability of a randomly sampled noise being played instead of
the selected action.
as slight changes in the hyper-parameters may result in
radical changes in the performance. We selected the OU
noise combined with α = 0.1 and a training ratio of 1:1.
An interesting insight is that in the PR-MDP criteria, the
adversary induces enough noise for exploration (Figure 1,
PR-MDP - No Noise plot). This can be seen when observing
the ‘no noise’ experiments, which show that the PR-MDP
approach outperforms the baseline even without additional
exploration noise.
6.4. Testing on various MuJoCo domains
Figure 2 presents our results, on various MuJoCo domains
(additional results in Appendix E). It is apparent that while
in the Hopper-v2 domain, the PR-MDP outperformed the
NR-MDP criterion; this does not hold on all domains. More-
over, in most of the domains, both operators outperform the
baseline, both in terms of robustness and in terms of perfor-
mance in the absence of perturbations. While the optimal
parameters may differ across domains; our results show that,
in most cases, the parameters transfer across domains and
result in improved performance without additional tuning.
Failures: It is also important to acknowledge the scenarios
in which our algorithm does not outperform the baseline.
Such an example is the InvertedPendulum domain, in which
the performance of the PR-MDP was found to be inferior
to that of its non-robust counterpart. We find two possible
explanations for this phenomenon (i) the parameter tuning
is performed on the Hopper domain (as opposed to selecting
the optimal hyper-parameters per each domain). As each do-
main is different, it is plausible that good hyper-parameters
in a certain domain would not be good in all domains. (ii)
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Specifically in the InvertedPendulum domain, where the
task is to balance a pole, an adversary which is too strong
(large α value) prevents the agent from successfully solving
the task.
NR-MDP PR-MDP
Figure 3. Diving Deeper: (Up) Testing Off-Policy Action-
Robustness, and (Down) Solving the MaxMin operator.
6.5. Diving Deeper
We attempt to analyze the behavior of our criteria (Figure 3)
by asking two questions: (i) Does the performance increase
due to the added perturbations from the adversary, or does
the operator itself induce a prior, e.g., regularization, on the
policy which leads to improved performance. (ii) How close
is the empirical behavior to its theoretical counterpart.
Off-Policy Action Robustness: In previous experiments,
during training, the action was drawn from the joint policy
of the agent and adversary, where the joint policy is specified
in the PR and NR-MDP approaches (see Definition 1,2).
A natural alternative approach is to act with the actor’s pol-
icy, yet, to acquire an action-robust policy in an off-policy
fashion. Meaning, use the same algorithms while obtaining
the data without the effect of the adversary. A possible ad-
vantage of such an approach is minimizing the number of
bad actions (since the adversary does not intervene), while
still benefiting from the presence of robust learning.
Figure 3 presents the results of this experiment. For the
NR-MDP, it seems that the operator itself, i.e., the training
is what results in the performance improvement; whereas
the adversarial exploration amount to a small increase in
stability. Surprisingly, an opposite effect is observed for the
PR-MDP. There, the combination of adversarial exploration
and the operator are both required in order to attain the
performance increase.
Does MaxMin equal MinMax? While so far we trained
our agent through N actor updates followed by a single
adversary gradient update, this corresponds to the MinMax
operator, in theory the opposite should result in an identical
performance (Proposition 1) for the PR-MDP approach, and
to deteriorate the performance for the NR-MDP approach
(Proposition 4).
Experimentally (Figure 3) the results show that as opposed
to the theoretical analysis, a ‘stronger’ adversary does result
in performance degradation. This could be due to two possi-
ble factors: (i) as we trained for the same number of steps
for both scenarios, it means that in this case the actor re-
ceives less gradient update steps, and/or (ii) it could be that
increasing the convergence of the adversary results in faster
convergence to a sub-optimal solution (w.r.t. the actor).
7. Summary
We have presented two new criteria for robustness, the Prob-
abilistic and Noisy action Robust MDP, related each to real
world scenarios of uncertainty and discussed the theoret-
ical differences between both approaches. Additionally;
we developed the Soft PR-PI (Algorithm 2), a policy it-
eration scheme for solving PR-MDPs. Building upon the
Soft PR-PI algorithm, we presented a deep reinforcement
learning approach, which is capable of solving our crite-
ria. We compared both criteria, analyzed how the various
hyper-parameters affect the behavior and how the empirical
results correlate (and occasionally contradict) with the theo-
retical approach. Most importantly, we notice that not only
does training with our criteria result in robust policies, but
our approach improves performance even in the absence of
perturbations.
Lastly, for solving an action-robust policy, there is no need
in providing an uncertainty set. The approach requires only
a scalar value, namely α (or possibly a state-dependent
α(s)), which implicitly defines an uncertainty set (see Sec-
tion 3.1). This is a major advantage compared to standard
robust approaches in RL and control, which, to the best of
our knowledge, require a distribution over models or per-
turbations. Of course, this benefit is also a restriction - the
Action Robust approach is unable to handle any kind of
worst-case perturbations. Yet, due to its simplicity, and its
demonstrated performance, it is worthwhile to be considered
by an algorithm designer.
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A. Discounted Markov Games
A.1. Preliminaries
We define the framework of discounted, two-player zero-sum Markov Games (MG) with finite state space and continuous
action space. A MG is determined by the 5-tuple (S,A,B, P,R, γ) (Patek, 1997). Here S is a finite state space, A and B
are compact subsets of RA, which represent the agent and adversary, respectively. For any (s, a, b) ∈ S × A× B let the
dynamics P = P (· | s, a, b) be a probability measure on S , and let the reward function r(s, a, b) be a bounded measureable
function on A× B for any s ∈ S. Consider a strategy of the players µ, ν, where both are probability measures over Borel
sets of A,B, respectively. Let rµ,ν ∈ R|S| where rµ,ν(s) def= Ea∼µ,b∼ν [r(s, µ, ν)], and the dynamics Pµ,ν ∈ R|S|×|S|,
where Pµ,νi,j
def
= Ea∼µ,b∼ν [P (sj | si, µ, piB)] and is a stochastic matrix. Following notation from Maitra & Parthasarathy
(1970), we denote PA and PB as the set of probability measures on the Borel sets of A and B, respectively.
Definition 3. The value of fixed strategy µ, ν is given by vµ,ν =
∑∞
t=0 γ
t(Pµ,ν)trµ,ν . Given a fixed ν ∈ PB the value
of the optimal counter strategy of player A is vν = supµ∈PA v
µ,ν . Accordingly, for a fixed µ ∈ PA the value of the
optimal counter strategy of player B is vµ = infν∈PB v
µ,ν . Furthermore, if the sup and inf are attainable, we refer to
arg minν∈PB v
µ,ν and arg maxµ∈PA v
µ,ν as optimal counter strategies to µ and ν, respectively.
We make the following assumptions on the dynamics and reward functions.
Assumption 1.
• Both A,B are compact metric spaces.
• For any s ∈ S the reward r is continuous and bounded function on A× B.
• For any s ∈ S , whenever (an, bn)→ (a, b), where (an, bn), (a, b) ∈ A× B, then P (· | s, an, bn) converges weakly to
P (· | s, a, b).
In the rest of the section we follow (Patek, 1997)[Section 2-3] that analyzed zero-sum MG for stochastic shortest paths,
while performing minor modifications for the discounted and continuous action-space setup.
Define the following Bellman operators.
Definition 4. Let PA and PB be the set of all probability measures on the Borel Sets of A and B, respectively, µ ∈ PA, ν ∈
PB , and let v ∈ R|S|. The Bellman operator, and Fixed-Policy Bellman operators are according to the following.
Tµ,νv = rµ,ν + γPµ,νv,
Tµv = min
ν∈PB
(rµ,ν + γPµ,νv) , T¯ νv = max
µ∈PA
(rµ,ν + γPµ,νv)
Tv = max
µ∈PA
min
ν∈PB
(rµ,ν + γPµ,νv) , T¯ v = min
ν∈PB
max
µ∈PA
(rµ,ν + γPµ,νv) ,
where equality holds component-wise.
Notice that the max and min are attainable since PA, PB are compact sets. Furthermore, by Maitra & Parthasarathy
(1970)[Lemma 2.2] and under Assumption 1, both the max and min are continuous and bounded. Thus, we can replace
sup inf and inf sup by corresponding max and min.
We have the following important lemma.
Lemma 6. For any bounded v ∈ R|S|, Tv = T¯ v.
Proof. Following similar arguments as in Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970), Equation 2, and using Sion’s minimax theorem
(Sion et al., 1958)[Theorem 3.4], for any s ∈ S we have that,
sup
µ∈PA
inf
ν∈PB
rµ,ν(s) + Pµ,νv(s) = inf
ν∈PB
sup
µ∈PA
rµ,ν(s) + Pµ,νv(s).
Since PA, PB are compact and rµ,ν + Pµ,νv is bounded and continuous on A × B for any s ∈ S, the sup, inf can be
replaced by min,max (e.g., by Maitra & Parthasarathy (1970)[Lemma 2.2]).
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The analysis in Patek (1997) is based on assumption R, which results in Tv = T¯ v. Since we allow the agents to use
mixed-strategies, according to Lemma 6, we obtain Tv = T¯ v in our setup as well. Furthermore, since we use discounted
MG, assumption SSP in Patek (1997) is also satisfied. Every strategy (µ, ν) is proper; it terminates with probability one, as
the discount factor (γ) is smaller than 1.
Lemma 7. Tµ,ν , Tµ, T¯ ν , T are γ contractions in the sup-norm.
Proof. We follow similar technique as in Patek (1997), adjusted to our setup. Let v1, v2 ∈ R|S|. Then,
Tµ,νv1 − Tµ,νv2 = γPµ,ν(v1 − v2) ≤ γPµ,ν1||v1 − v2||∞ = γ1||v1 − v2||∞,
where 1 is the one vector. The last relation holds since Pµ,ν is a stochastic matrix and thus Pµ,ν1 = 1. By repeating the
same argument for Tµ,νv2 − Tµ,νv1 and taking the sup-norm we conclude that ||Tµ,νv1 − Tµ,νv2||∞ ≤ γ||v1 − v2||∞.
We now prove similar result on Tµ. Let ν, ν′ ∈ PB such that Tµv1 = Tµ,νv1, Tµv2 = Tµ,ν′v2. Then,
Tµv1 − Tµv2 ≤ Tµ,νv1 − Tµ,νv2,
Tµv2 − Tµv1 ≤ Tµ,ν′v1 − Tµ,ν′v2.
By taking the sup-norm and using the fact Tµ,ν is a γ-contraction, we conclude that Tµ is also a γ-contraction. Similar
argument establishes that T¯ ν is a γ-contraction.
Lastly, let µ ∈ PA such that Tv2 = Tµv2, and ν ∈ PB such that Tµv1 = Tµ,νv1. Then,
Tv1 − Tv2 = Tv1 − Tµv2
≤ Tµv1 − Tµv2
= Tµ,νv1 − Tµv2
≤ Tµ,νv1 − Tµ,νv2.
Similar argument leads to Tv2 − Tv1 ≤ Tµ,νv2 − Tµ,νv1 for properly defined µ, ν. Again, by taking the sup norm and
using the fact that Tµ,ν is a γ-contraction we conclude the proof.
The following propositions relate the fixed-point of Tµ, T¯ ν to the values and policies defined in 3. Furthermore, the last one
establishes the fact the zero-sum MG has value.
Proposition 8. The following claims hold.
• Let µ ∈ PA, ν ∈ PB be stationary policies. The value vµ,ν is the fixed point of the operator Tµ,ν , vµ,ν = Tµ,νvµ,ν .
• Given a policy ν ∈ PB , vν = supµ∈PA is the unique fixed point of T¯ ν . Furthermore, the sup is attainable in the set A.
• Given a policy µ ∈ PA, vµ = infν∈PB is the unique fixed point of Tµ. Furthermore, the inf is attainable in the set B.
Proof. The proof of the first claim is standard, e.g., Puterman (1994)[Section 6.1]. By fixing a policy for any of the players
the problem amounts for solving a single agent MDP (e.g., Puterman (1994)). Due to Assumption 1, the reward and
dynamics of the MDP are also continuous and bounded. Since the action set in compact for both player A and B, we can
use Puterman (1994)[Theorem 6.2.10] and conclude the proof.
Proposition 9. The unique fixed point v∗ = Tv∗ is also the equilibrium value of the zero-sum MG,
v∗ = supµ∈PA infν∈PB v
µ,ν = infν∈PB supµ∈PA v
µ,ν , thus, the MG has a well defined value.
Furthermore, the stationary policies µ ∈ PA, ν ∈ PB for which v∗ = T¯ v∗ = Tv∗ = Tµ,νv∗ are in Nash-Equilibrium, and
satisfy vµ
′,ν∗ ≤ v∗ ≤ vµ∗,ν for any ν′ ∈ PB , µ′ ∈ PA.
Proof. See proof Patek (1997)[Proposition 3.2].
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Algorithm 3 Zero-Sum Markov-Game PI
Initialize: ν0, k = 0
while stopping criterion is not satisfied do
µk ∈ arg maxµ vµ,νk
νk+1 ∈ arg minν T¯ νvµk,νk
k ← k + 1
end while
Return pik−1
Algorithm 4 Soft Zero-Sum Markov-Game PI
Initialize: ν0, k = 0, η ∈ (0, 1]
while stopping criterion is not satisfied do
µk ∈ arg maxµ vµ,νk
ν′ ∈ arg minν T¯ νvµk,νk
νk+1 = (1− η)νk + ην′
k ← k + 1
end while
Return pik−1
A.2. Policy Iteration and Soft Policy Iteration for Zero-Sum Markov Games
In this section, we formulate two PI schemes that solve a zero-sum MG. The Zero-Sum MG PI scheme (see Alg. 3) is a well
known one (Hoffman & Karp, 1966; Rao et al., 1973; Hansen et al., 2013).
The Soft Zero-Sum MG PI (see Alg. 4) generalizes the usual PI. Instead of updating with a 1-step greedy policy it updates
softly w.r.t. the 1-step greedy policy. Although this generalization has been analyzed extensively for a single-agent PI
(e.g., (Kakade & Langford, 2002; Scherrer, 2014)), to the best of our knowledge, it was not analyzed in the context of
Markov-Games.
By generalizing arguments from (Scherrer, 2014) to framework of Zero-Sum MG (defined in Section A.1) we prove the
following result.
Theorem 10. The sequence vk
def
= vµk,νk contracts toward v∗ with rate of 1− η + γη, i.e.,
||vk − v∗α|| ≤ (1− η + γη)||vk−1 − v∗α|| .
As a corollary, and by plugging η = 1, we get the convergence rate of Zero-Sum MG PI. Notice that although the action
space is continuous the proof follows using standard machinery, since the state space is still finite. We now give the proof of
the theorem.
The proof has two steps. We first show v∗ ≤ vk+1 ≤ vk, where vk def= vµk,νk . Building on this fact, we prove the contraction
property by generalizing technique from (Scherrer, 2014)[Theorem 1], to two player game.
Lemma 11. v∗ ≤ vk+1 ≤ vk.
Proof. We have that vk = vµk,νk .
vµk,νk = T¯ νkvµk,νk
= (1− η)T¯ νkvµk,νk + ηT¯ νkvµk,νk
≥ (1− η)T¯ νkvµk,νk + min
ν∈PB
ηT¯ νvµk,νk
= (1− η)T¯ νkvµk,νk + ηT¯ ν′vµk,νk
= max
µ∈PA
((1− η)Tµ,νkvµk,νk) + max
µ∈PA
(
ηT¯µ,ν
′
vµk,νk
)
≥ max
µ∈PA
(
(1− η)Tµ,νkvµk,νk + ηT¯µ,ν′vµk,νk
)
= max
µ∈PA
Tµ,(1−η)νk+ην
′
vµk,νk = T¯ (1−η)νk+ην
′
vµk,νk . (5)
The first relation holds due to Proposition 8, the forth relation holds by construction of ν′, minν∈PB T¯
νvµk,νk =
T¯ ν
′
vµk,νk , the fifth relation is by Definition 4, the sixth relation holds since sum of maximum elements is big-
ger than the maximum of a sum, and the seventh relation holds since the fixed-policy Bellman operator satisfies
Tµ,(1−η)ν1+ην2 = (1− η)Tµ,ν1 + ηTµ,ν2 .
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Due to the monotonicity of T¯ (1−η)νk+ην
′
(e.g, Patek (1997)[Appendix A]), we can repeatedly use (5),
vk ≥ T¯ (1−η)νk+ην′vk ≥ · · · ≥ lim
n→∞(T¯
(1−η)νk+ην′)nvk = vk+1,
where vk+1 = vµk+1,νk+1 . Indeed, T¯ (1−η)νk+ην
′
is the optimal Bellman operator given a fixed adversary strategy,
(1− η)νk + ην′.
Lastly, we show that in each iteration v∗ ≤ vk. For any adversarial strategy νk,
vk = max
µ∈PA
vµ,νk ≥ min
ν∈PB
max
µ∈PA
vµ,ν = v∗.
Where the third relation holds by Proposition 9.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 10.
Proof. As before, define vk
def
= vµk,νk . We have that,
v∗ − vk+1 = v∗ − Tµk+1,(1−η)νk+ην′vk+1
≥ v∗ − Tµk+1,(1−η)νk+ην′vk
= (1− η)(v∗ − Tµk+1,νkvk) + η(v∗ − Tµk+1,ν′vk), (6)
where the first relation holds since vk+1 = vµk+1,(1−η)νk+ην
′
and the second relation holds since Tµ,ν is a monotone
operator and vk+1 ≤ vk by Lemma 11.
Consider the first term in (6).
v∗ − Tµk+1,νkvk ≥ v∗ − Tµk,νkvk = vk. (7)
The first relation holds since Tµk,νkvk = maxµ∈PA T
µ,νkvk and the second relation holds since by definition vk = vµk,νk =
Tµk,νkvµk,νk (due to Proposition 8).
Remember that ν′ ∈ arg minν∈PB T¯ νvk (as in the update of Alg. 4). Thus,
T¯ ν
′
vk = min
ν∈PB
T¯ νvk = min
ν∈PB
max
µ∈PA
Tµ,νvk = max
µ∈PA
min
ν∈PB
Tµ,ν = Tvk, (8)
where the third relation is due to Lemma 6.
Now, for the second term in (6) we have that,
v∗ − Tµk+1,ν′vk = Tv∗ − Tµk+1,ν′vk
≥ Tµ∗,ν∗v∗ − max
µ∈PA
Tµ,ν
′
vk
= Tv∗ − Tvk. (9)
The first relation holds since v∗ is the fixed point of T , and the third relation holds by (8).
Plugging (7) and (9) to (6) yields,
v∗ − vk+1 ≥ (1− η)(v∗ − vk) + η(Tv∗ − Tvk).
Since 0 ≥ v∗ − vk+1 by Lemma 11, we can take the max-norm and conclude the proof,
||v∗ − vk+1||∞ ≤ (1− η)||v∗ − vk||∞ + η||Tv∗ − Tvk||∞
≤ (1− η)||v∗ − vk||∞ + ηγ||v∗ − vk||∞,
where the first relation holds by the triangle inequality and the second holds since T is a γ-contraction by Proposition 7.
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B. Probabilistic Action Robust MDP
In this section, we focus on PR-MDPs (Section 3) and map the problem of solving the optimal probabilistic robust policy to
solving a Zero-Sum MG. We then continue and provide the proofs of Section 3, which are mostly corollaries to the results in
Section A.
For simplicity, we provide the definition of PR-MDPs as given in Section 3.
Definition 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Probabilistic Action Robust MDP is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1). Let
pi, p¯i be policies of an agent an adversary. We define their probabilistic joint policy pimixP,α(pi, p¯i) as ∀s ∈ S, pimixP,α(a | s) ≡
(1− α)pi(a | s) + αp¯i(a | s).
Let pi be an agent policy. As opposed to standard MDPs, the value of the policy is defined by
vpiP,α = minp¯i∈Π E
pimixP,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t γ
tr(st,at)], where at ∼ pimixP,α(pi(st), p¯i(st)). The optimal probabilistic robust policy is
the optimal policy of the PR-MDP
pi∗P,α ∈ arg max
pi∈P(Π)
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
P,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)]. (1)
The optimal probabilistic robust value is v∗P,α = v
pi∗P,α
P,α .
B.1. Probabilistic Action Robust MDP as a Zero-Sum Markov Game
Consider the single agent MDP on which the PR-MDP is defined,M = (S,A, P,R, γ).
Assumption 2.
• A is compact metric space.
• For any s ∈ S the reward r is continuous and bounded function on A.
• For any s ∈ S, whenever (an)→ (a), where (an), (a) ∈ A, then P (· | s, an) converges weakly to P (· | s, a).
Solving the optimal probabilistic robust policy can be equivalently viewed as solving a Zero-Sum MG MP,α. Let
MP,α = (S,A,A, PP,α, RP,α, γ). Meaning, its state-space is equal to that of the original MDP, the action space of the two
players is the action space of the original MDP, and its discount factor is equal to the discount factor ofM. Its reward and
dynamics are given as follows,
rP,α(s, a, b) = (1− α)r(s, a) + αr(s, b), PP,α(s′ | s, a, b) = (1− α)P (s′ | s, a) + αP (s′ | s, b). (10)
By Assumption 2 onM, Assumption 1 on the MG is satisfied.
It is easy to prove that a value vpi
mix
P,α(pi1,pi2) defined onM is equal to the value vpi1,pi2 defined onMP,α. Since there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the problems, solving the later is equivalent to solving the first.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the Zero-Sum MGMP,α, and let PA be the set of all probability measures on the Borel Sets of A. We see that the
Bellman operators ofMP,α (Definition 4) decouples to two terms due to (10),
Tv = max
µ∈PA
min
ν∈PA
rµ,ν + γPµ,νv
= (1− α)
(
max
µ∈PA
rµ + Pµv
)
+ α
(
min
ν∈PA
rµ + Pµv
)
, (11)
and similarly for Tµ, T¯ ν and Tµ,ν .
According to Proposition 9 the the optimal policy for the max-agent µ∗ satisfies v∗ = Tv∗ = Tµ
∗
v∗. Thus, µ∗ should
satisfy
(1− α)
(
max
µ∈PA
rµ + Pµv∗
)
+ α
(
min
ν∈PA
rµ + Pµv∗
)
= (1− α)
(
rµ
∗
+ Pµ
∗
v∗
)
+ α
(
min
ν∈PA
rµ + Pµv∗
)
⇐⇒ max
µ∈PA
rµ + Pµv∗ = rµ
∗
+ Pµ
∗
v∗
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meaning, µ∗ ∈ maxµ∈PA rµ + Pµv∗ which can always be solved by a deterministic policy.
B.3. Probabilistic Action Robust and Robust MDPs
Based on the mapping between a PR-MDP to a corresponding Zero-Sum MG B.1 the relation to Robust MDPs becomes
apparent. Instead for the adversary to pick an action which induces a change in the dynamics and reward 10, the adversary
can directly choose the dynamics and reward. Obviously, the value of such a policy is similar under this equivalent view. We
conclude the result since the adversary is defined on the class of stochastic policies P(Π).
B.4. Proof of Proposition 2
Repeating the same arguments as in Policy Gradient Theorem (Sutton et al., 2000)[Theorem 1] for continuous action space
we have that for any s ∈ S and pi ∈ P(Π), i.e., any stochastic stationary policy,
∇pivpi(s) =
∑
s
dpi(s)
∫
a∈A
∇pipi(s,a)qpi(s,a)da
Notice that we can replace the integration and differentiation order by Leibniz integral rule since ∇pivpi(s) exists and is
bounded. Let h(· | s) be a deterministic probability measure on A. Similarly to (Scherrer & Geist, 2014) for any s ∈ S,
〈∇pivpi(s), h〉 =
∑
s
dpi(s)
∫
a∈A
〈∇pipi(s,a), h〉qpi(s,a)da
=
∑
s
dpi(s)qpi(s, h(s)).
To minimize 〈∇pivpi(s), h〉 we choose for any s ∈ S, ah ∈ arg mina qpi(·, a) = arg minpi′ rpi
′
+ γPpi
′
vpi .
B.5. Proof of Theorem 3
The theorem is a corollary of Theorem 10 and Proposition 2, while using the structure of the defined zero-sum MG for
PR-MDP in Section B.1,MP,α.
Specifically, the first stage of the general Soft Zero-Sum MG PI 4 is similar to the first stage of Soft Probabilistic Robust
PI 2. Furthermore, forMP,α it holds for any bounded v ∈ R|S|,
arg min
ν∈PA
T¯ νv = arg min
ν∈PA
max
µ∈PA
Tµ,νv
= arg min
ν∈PA
max
µ∈PA
(1− α)(rµ + γPµv) + α(rν + γP νv)
= arg min
ν∈PA
(rν + γP νv) ,
where the first relation holds by definition 4, the second relation holds due to the specific form of the Bellman operators
similarly to (11), and the third relation holds since the first term does not depend on ν.
By using Proposition 2 we get that Soft Probabilistic Robust PI 2 is an instance of the more general Soft Zero-Sum MG PI 4,
and prove the Theorem as a corollary of Theorem 10.
C. Noisy Action Robust MDP as a Zero-Sum Markov Game
We focus on NR-MDPs (Section 4) and map the problem of solving the optimal noisy robust policy to solving a Zero-Sum
MG. As in previous section, the proofs of Section 4, are mostly corollaries to the results in Section A.
For simplicity, we provide the definition of NR-MDPs as given in Section 3.
Definition 2. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. A Noisy Action Robust MDP is defined by the 5-tuple of an MDP (see Section 2.1). Let pi, p¯i be
policies of an agent and an adversary. We define their noisy joint policy pimixN,α(pi, p¯i) as
∀s ∈ S,a ∈ A, pimixN,α(a | s) ≡ Eb∼pi(·|s)
b¯∼p¯i(·|s)
[1a=(1−α)b+αb¯],
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the relation is obtained by the fact that a ∼ pi, a¯ ∼ p¯i.
Let pi be an agent policy. For NR-MDP, its value is defined by vpiN,α = minp¯i∈Π E
pimixN,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t γ
tr(st,at)], where at ∼
pimixN,α(pi(st), p¯i(st)). The optimal α-noisy robust policy is the optimal policy of the NR-MDP
pi∗N,α ∈ arg max
pi∈P(Π)
min
p¯i∈Π
Epi
mix
N,α(pi,p¯i)[
∑
t
γtr(st,at)]. (2)
The optimal noisy robust value is v∗N,α = v
pi∗N,α
N,α .
C.1. Noisy Action Robust MDP as a Zero-Sum Markov Game
Consider the single agent MDP on which the NR-MDP is defined,M = (S,A, P,R, γ) and assume it satisfies Assumption
2. Solving the optimal probabilistic robust policy can be equivalently viewed as solving a Zero-Sum MGMN,α. Let
MN,α = (S,A,A, PN,α, RN,α, γ). Meaning, its state-space is equal to that of the original MDP, the action space of the
two players is the action space of the original MDP, and its discount factor is equal to the discount factor ofM. Its reward
and dynamics are given as follows,
rN,α(s, a, b) = r(s, (1− α)a+ αb), PP,α(s′ | s, a, b) = P (s′ | s, (1− α)a+ αb). (12)
Since the single agent MDP satisfies Assumption Assumption 2, the MG game defined byMN,α satisfies 1.
It is easy to prove that a value vpi
mix
N (pi1,pi2) defined on the induced NR-MDP fromM is equal to the value vpi1,pi2 defined on
the MGMN,α. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between the problems, solving the later is equivalent to solving
the first.
C.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Consider an MDP with a single state a quadratic reward of the form r(a) = a2 where a ∈ [−1, 1]. In this case, the solution
does not depend on the horizon and an optimal action w.r.t. a single time step will be the solution for the discounted reward.
Denote P([−1, 1]) as the set of all probability measures on the Borel sets of [−1, 1].
If both of the players are only allowed to take deterministic actions, then the min-max and max-min values are not equivalent,
max
a∈[−1,1]
min
b∈[−1,1]
((1− α)a+ αb)2 =
{
(1− 2α)2, α ≤ 0.5
0, α > 0.5
min
b∈[−1,1]
max
a∈[−1,1]
((1− α)a+ αb)2 = (1− α)2.
Thus, for this example, strong duality on the sets of deterministic policies does not hold,
max
a∈[−1,1]
min
b∈[−1,1]
((1− α)a+ αb)2 < min
b∈[−1,1]
max
a∈[−1,1]
((1− α)a+ αb)2 = (1− α)2.
Furthermore, we now show that considering random policies can increase the value. Let the policy of the max-player be
P (a = −1) = P (a = 1) = 0.5, obviously, P ∈ P([−1, 1]). For this policy, we have that,
min
b∈[−1,1]
Ea∼P (·)[(1− α)a+ αb)2] = min
b∈[−1,1]
(1− α)2 + α2b = (1− α)2.
We conclude that for this example
max
a∈[−1,1]
min
b∈[−1,1]
((1− α)a+ αb)2 < max
P∈P([−1,1])
min
b∈[−1,1]
Ea∼P [((1− α)a+ αb)2].
C.3. Policy Iteration of NR-MDP
We can use the Soft Zero-Sum MG PI (see Algorithm 4), or, by fixing η = 1, Zero-Sum MG PI.
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The algorithm repeats two stages of (i) solving an MDP by fixing the adversary policy, (ii) solving a 1-step greedy minimax
decision problem on the set of stochastic policies. This comes in contrast to the corresponding PI algorithm that solves
PR-MDP. There, stage (ii) involved in solving a single agent, 1-step greedy, decision problem. This problem can be more
easily solved by function maximization.
Furthermore, this fact suggest that a simple Frank-Wolfe update (Frank & Wolfe, 1956), as was performed in Soft
Probabilistic Robust PI (Algorithm 2) would not work, at least not using the analysis we suggested here. Meaning, a relation
between the maximal projection on the gradient ∇pivpi and the 1-step greedy minimax decision problem, as shown to hold
in Proposition 2, would not exists.
D. Actor Gradients Proof
Proof. Our proof follows the proof of the deterministic policy gradients (DPG) (Silver et al., 2014).
In order to retain consistency with (Silver et al., 2014), we denote the deterministic policy pi by µ : S 7→ A. The parametrized
policies µθ and µ¯θ¯ are, respectively, the actor and adversary policies. We refer to the α-mixture policy pi
mix
N/P,α(µθ, µ¯θ¯)
simply as pimixN/P,α(θ, θ¯), for ease of notation.
Assumption 3. p(s′ | s,a),∇ap(s′ | s,a), µθ(s),∇θµθ(s), µ¯θ¯(s),∇θ¯µ¯θ¯(s), r(s,a),∇ar(s,a), p1(s) are continuous in
all parameters and variables s,a, s′ and x.
Assumption 4. There exists a b and L such that sups p1(s) < b, supa,s,s′ p(s′ | s,a) < b, supa,s r(s,a) <
b, supa,s,s′ ||∇ap(s′ | s,a)|| < L, and sups,a ||∇ar(s,a)|| < L.
NR-MDP:
∇θvpimixN,α(θ,θ¯) = ∇θQpimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s))
= ∇θ
(
r(s, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)) +
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s))vpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)
)
d s′
= ∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇ar(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s) +∇θ
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s))vpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= ∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇θr(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s)
+
∫
S
γ
(
p(s′ | s, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s))∇θvpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) +∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇ap(s′ | s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s) v
pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)
)
d s′
= ∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇a
(
r(s,a) +
∫
S
γp(s′ | s,a)vpimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
)
|a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s)
+
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s))∇θvpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= ∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s) +
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θvpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′ .
Where p(s→ s′, t, pi) denotes the density at state s′ after transitioning for t steps from state s. Iterating this formula leads
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to the following result:
∇θvpimixN,α(θ,θ¯) = ∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s)
+
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s′)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) d s
′
+
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))
∫
S
γp(s′ → s′′, 1, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θvpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′′)d s′′ d s′
= ∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s)
+
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s′)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) d s
′
+
∫
S
γ2p(s→ s′, 2, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θvpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
=
∫
S
∞∑
t=0
γtp(s→ s′, t, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s′)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) d s
′ .
Taking the expectation over S1:
∇θJ(pimixN,α(θ, θ¯)) = ∇θ
∫
S
p1(s)v
pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s)d s
=
∫
S
p1(s)∇θvpimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s)d s
=
∫
S
∫
S
∞∑
t=0
γtp1(s)p(s→ s′, t, pimixN,α(θ, θ¯))∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s′)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) d s
′ d s
=
∫
S
ρpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)∇θpimixN,α(θ, θ¯)(s)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s) d s
=
∫
S
ρpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)∇θ((1− α)µθ(s) + αµ¯θ¯(s))∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s) d s
= (1− α)
∫
S
ρpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=pimixN,α(θ,θ¯)(s) d s
notice that compared to the standard DPGs (Silver et al., 2014), the gradient is w.r.t. the actor’s (adversary’s) policy and is
weighted by 1− α (α). Similar to the DPG, the gradient of the action-value function is taken w.r.t. the action taken (the
mixture policy).
PR-MDP: The PR-MDP, constructed by two deterministic policies µθ and µ¯θ¯ can be defined as follows:
pimixP,α(u | s; θ, θ¯) = (1− α)δ(u− µθ(s)) + αδ(u− µ¯θ¯(s)).
vpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯) =
∫
A
pimixP,α(u | s; θ, θ¯)Qpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯)(s))du
∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯) = ∇θ
∫
A
pimixP,α(u | s; θ, θ¯)Qpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s, u)du
= ∇θ[(1− α)QpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µθ(s)) + αQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µ¯θ¯(s))]
= (1− α)∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µθ(s)) + α∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µ¯θ¯(s))
we address each element, (1)∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µθ(s)) and (2) QpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µ¯θ¯(s)), individually:
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(1):
∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µθ(s)) = ∇
(
r(s, µθ(s)) +
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µθ(s))vpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)
)
d s′
= ∇θµθ(s)∇ar(s,a) |a=µθ(s) +∇θ
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µθ(s))vpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= ∇θµθ(s)∇θr(s,a) |a=µθ(s)
+
∫
S
γ
(
p(s′ | s, µθ(s))∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) +∇θµθ(s)∇ap(s′ | s,a) |a=µθ(s) vpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)
)
d s′
= ∇θµθ(s)∇a
(
r(s,a) +
∫
S
γp(s′ | s,a)vpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
)
|a=µθ(s)
+
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µθ(s))∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= ∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=µθ(s) +
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, µθ)∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′ .
Where p(s→ s′, t, pi) denotes the density at state s′ after transitioning for t steps from state s.
(2):
∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µ¯θ¯(s)) = ∇θ
(
r(s, µ¯θ¯(s)) +
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µ¯θ¯(s))vpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)
)
d s′
= ∇θµ¯θ¯(s)∇ar(s,a) |a=µ¯θ¯(s) +∇θ
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µ¯θ¯(s))vpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
=
∫
S
γ
(
p(s′ | s, µ¯θ¯(s))∇θvpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′) +∇θµ¯θ¯(s)∇ap(s′ | s,a) |a=µ¯θ¯(s) vpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)
)
d s′
=
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µ¯θ¯(s))∇θvpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′ .
Hence:
∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯) = (1− α)∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µθ(s)) + α∇θQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s, µ¯θ¯(s))
= (1− α)∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=µθ(s)
+ (1− α)
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, µθ)∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′+α
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, µ¯θ¯(s))∇θvpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= (1− α)∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=µθ(s) +
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯)(s))∇θvpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
Applying this iteratively:
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∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯) = (1− α)∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=µθ(s)
+
∫
S
γp(s′ | s, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯)(s))∇θvpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= (1− α)∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=µθ(s)
+
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))∇θµθ(s′)∇aQpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=µθ(s′) d s′
+
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))
∫
S
γp(s′ → s′′, 1, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))∇θvpi
mix
N,α(θ,θ¯)(s′′)d s′′ d s′
= (1− α)∇θµθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=µθ(s)
+ (1− α)
∫
S
γp(s→ s′, 1, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))∇θµθ(s′)∇aQpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=µθ(s′) d s′
+
∫
S
γ2p(s→ s′, 2, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))∇θvpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′)d s′
= (1− α)
∫
S
∞∑
t=0
γtp(s→ s′, t, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))∇θµθ(s′)∇aQpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=µθ(s′) d s′ .
Taking the expectation over S1:
∇θJ(pimixP,α(θ, θ¯)) = ∇θ
∫
S
p1(s)v
pimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s)d s
=
∫
S
p1(s)∇θvpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s)d s
= (1− α)
∫
S
∫
S
∞∑
t=0
γtp1(s)p(s→ s′, t, pimixP,α(θ, θ¯))∇θpiθ(s′)∇aQpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)(s′,a) |a=piθ(s′) d s′ d s
= (1− α)
∫
S
ρpi
mix
P,α(θ,θ¯)∇θpiθ(s)∇aQpimixP,α(θ,θ¯)(s,a) |a=piθ(s) d s
the resulting gradient update for the actor does not directly take into consideration the policy of the adversary, thus resulting
in a gradient rule similar (weighted by (1− α) for the actor and α for the adversary) to that seen in Silver et al. (2014).
Intuitively, as the action is sampled w.p. (1− α) from the actor and w.p, α from the adversary, each player acts greedily at
the immediate step ignoring potential perturbations. The mutual effect of the actor and adversary is attained through the Q
value which captures the long term return of the mixture policy.
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Algorithm 5 Action-Robust DDPG
Input: Actor update steps (N ), uncertainty value α and discount factor γ
Randomly initialize critic network Q(s,a;φ), actor f(s; θ) and adversary f¯(s; θ¯)
Initialize target networks with weights φ−, θ−, θ¯−
Initialize replay buffer R
for episode in 0...M do
Receive initial state s0
for t in 0...T do
Sample action at =
{
f(s; θpi) w.p. (1− α) and f¯(s; θp¯i) otherwise , PR-MDP
(1− α)f(s; θpi) + αf¯(s; θ¯p¯i) , NR-MDP
a˜t = at + exploration noise
Execute action a˜t and observe reward rt and new state st+1
Store transition (st, a˜t, rt, st+1) in R
for i in 0...N do
Sample batch from replay buffer
Update actor:
θ ←
{
∇θ(1− α)Q(s, f(s; θ)) ,PR-MDP
∇θQ(s, (1− α)f(s; θ) + αf¯(s; θ¯)) ,NR-MDP
Update critic:
φ←
{
∇φ||r + γ[(1− α)Q(s′, f(s′; θ−)) + αQ(s′, f(s′; θ¯−))]||22 ,PR-MDP
∇φ||r + γ[Q(s′, (1− α)f(s′; θ−) + αf(s′; θ¯−))]||22 ,NR-MDP
end for
Sample batch from replay buffer
Update adversary:
θ¯ ←
{
∇θ¯αQ(s, f¯(s; θ¯)) ,PR-MDP
∇θ¯Q(s, (1− α)f(s; θ) + αf¯(s; θ¯)) ,NR-MDP
Update critic
Update the target networks:
θ− ← τθ + (1− τ)θ−
θ¯− ← τ θ¯ + (1− τ)θ¯−
φ− ← τφ+ (1− τ)φ−
end for
end for
Algorithm 5 presents our Action Robust approach adapted to the DDPG algorithm (Lillicrap et al., 2015). The action we
play during exploration is based on the exploration scheme selected, OU noise adds noise at the action level whereas in
parameter space noise we pertube the parameters θ and θ¯.
Notice that the critic update is different, in both scenarios, from the default DDPG update rule. The reason is that the critic is
updated based on the expectation over the policy, which in the NR-MDP results in the α mixture policy and in the PR-MDP
a convex sum of Q values.
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Figure 4 presents a block diagram of our approach for the NR-MDP scenario:
Figure 4. Action Robust DDPG, NR-MDP
Actor
+
Adversary
Critic
Q(s, pimixN (s))
s
s
µ(s) µ¯(s)
pimixN (µ, µ¯)(s)
We improve the actor (adversary) by taking the gradient of Q w.r.t. θ(θ¯) and performing backpropagation through the critic.
Autograd engines (Baydin et al., 2018) automatically ensure that the gradients propagate directly to the actor (adversary)
without affecting the adversary (actor) or the critic. During exploration we simply play pimixN a deterministic policy (as it is a
convex sum of two deterministic values).
For the PR-MDP the schema is similar to the standard DDPG approach.
Figure 5. Action Robust DDPG, PR-MDP
Actor
+
Adversary
s
µ(s) µ¯(s)
pimixP (µ, µ¯)(s)
Figure 5 depicts the block diagram during exploration. pimixP defines a stochastic policy over µ and µ¯. Thus, with probability
1− α we sample action µ(s) and otherwise µ¯(s).
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Figure 6. Action Robust DDPG, PR-MDP
Actor
Critic
Q(s, µ(s))
s
s
µ(s)
Figure 6 presents the approach during training. This approach is identical to the standard DDPG approach, except that once
taking the gradient∇θQ(s, µθ(s)), we multiply the loss (similar to a change of learning rate) by 1− α.
The critic is trained on the expectation over the mixture policies, which in the case of DDPG results in Q(s,a) =
r(s,a) + γ[(1− α)Q(s′, µ(s′)) + αQ(s′, µ¯(s′))].
Action Robust Reinforcement Learning and Applications in Continuous Control
E. Empirical Results
No Noise OU Noise Param Noise
Figure 7. NR-MDP: exploration and α ablation.
Figure 8. NR-MDP: α and training ratio ablation.
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No Noise OU Noise Param Noise
Figure 9. PR-MDP: exploration and α ablation.
Figure 10. PR-MDP: α and training ratio ablation.
Action Robust Reinforcement Learning and Applications in Continuous Control
Baseline NR-MDP PR-MDP
Hopper
Walker2d
Humanoid
InvertedPendulum
Figure 11. Robustness to model uncertainty. Noise probability denotes the probability of a randomly sampled noise being played instead
of the selected action.
Action Robust Reinforcement Learning and Applications in Continuous Control
Baseline NR-MDP PR-MDP
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Ant
Figure 12. Robustness to model uncertainty continued. Noise probability denotes the probability of a randomly sampled noise being
played instead of the selected action.
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Figure 13. Robustness to mass uncertainty.
